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Abstract
Recognizing that truth is socially constructed or that knowledge and power are related is hardly a novelty in the social sci-
ences. In the twenty-first century, however, there appears to be a renewed concern regarding people’s relationship with the 
truth and the propensity for certain actors to undermine it. Organizations are highly implicated in this, given their central roles 
in knowledge management and production and their attempts to learn, although the entanglement of these epistemological 
issues with business ethics has not been engaged as explicitly as it might be. Drawing on work from a virtue epistemology 
perspective, this paper outlines the idea of a set of epistemic vices permeating organizations, along with examples of unethical 
epistemic conduct by organizational actors. While existing organizational research has examined various epistemic virtues 
that make people and organizations effective and responsible epistemic agents, much less is known about the epistemic 
vices that make them ineffective and irresponsible ones. Accordingly, this paper introduces vice epistemology, a nascent but 
growing subfield of virtue epistemology which, to the best of our knowledge, has yet to be explicitly developed in terms of 
business ethics. The paper concludes by outlining a business ethics research agenda on epistemic vice, with implications for 
responding to epistemic vices and their illegitimacy in practice.
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Introduction
The politically contested nature of truth-claims and their 
manipulation via propaganda, ideology, and other forms of 
power, social construction, and knowledge production are a 
familiar mainstay of social scientific inquiry. In the twenty-
first century, however, a renewed set of debates and concerns 
is emerging around politics, the media, public relations (PR), 
and the public’s problematic relationship with the truth—
with phrases like ‘alternative facts,’ ‘post-truth,’ ‘fake news,’ 
and ‘bullshit’ being highlighted within academic and popu-
lar discourse (e.g., Ball 2017; D’Ancona 2017; Davis 2017; 
Paul 2017; Spicer 2017).
Organizations are and have always been heavily impli-
cated in these issues. Knowingly or unknowingly, they take 
up their own distinctive stances on knowledge production 
(Kilduff et al. 2011). Furthermore, at individual and collec-
tive levels, organizations struggle with learning processes 
(Argyris 2003), managing various types of knowledge and 
knowing (Cook and Brown 1999), and, most politically and 
ethically, sometimes end up playing games with the truth, 
producing and reproducing distinct forms of language and 
discourse (Mauws and Phillips 1995; Munro 2017; Phillips 
and Oswick 2012).
Despite these profound linkages between knowledge, 
truth, and organization, explicit acknowledgement of the 
entanglement between epistemology and ethics remains rela-
tively under-explored (de Bruin 2013, 2015). In the same 
way that politics and ethics can be artificially separated by 
different researchers working at different levels of analysis 
and with different concerns (Parker 2003), epistemology is 
often regarded in non-ethical, analytical terms as part of 
a research methodology, or in terms of the cognition and 
information processing capacities of organizations. In phi-
losophy too, epistemology has not always been tradition-
ally concerned with ethics either, often restricting itself to 
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analytical discussions of how justification, truth, and belief 
relate to definitions of knowledge (Battaly 2016).
For (business) ethicists, this widespread omission of epis-
temology from ethics and ethics from epistemology is both 
surprising and significant. Surprising given the general links 
between epistemological concerns, such as how we acquire 
knowledge, and ethical concerns, such as how we deliver fair 
hearings or deliberate on policy-making (e.g., Griffin 2011; 
Kidd et al. 2017). Significant because a failure to consider 
these epistemic–ethical relationships risks leaving the spread 
of ignorance and confusion inadequately theorized (Oreskes 
and Conway 2012), and fails to hold accountable those who 
disregard ‘epistemic goods’ such as ‘truth,’ ‘justification,’ 
‘wisdom,’ and ‘understanding’ as responsible for the con-
sequences of their attitudes and actions (Matheson and Vitz 
2014). Consequently, a growing number of scholars have 
begun voicing these concerns (de Bruin 2013, 2015), calling 
for an ‘epistemic ethics’ (Buchanan 2009), and the develop-
ment of theory around epistemic–ethical interfaces.
In this vein, the current paper draws on an important, 
under-examined contemporary development in epistemol-
ogy that acts to lift the contrived divide between the epis-
temic and the ethical: virtue (and vice) epistemology. Virtue 
epistemology is the study of the cognitive character traits 
and attitudes that make us effective at, and responsible for, 
acquiring and transmitting epistemic goods (Battaly 2014). 
We can elucidate virtue epistemology by comparison with 
the more well-known field of virtue ethics. Just as Anscombe 
and modern virtue ethicists (e.g., MacIntyre 1981; Moore 
2008; Solomon 1992) call for a shift in emphasis of ethical 
evaluation from acts onto agents—or, more specifically, to 
the character traits that constitute virtues and vices—vir-
tue epistemologists argue that epistemic evaluation ought 
to shift its focus away from beliefs and onto agents and their 
cognitive characters (Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996).
What is significant about virtue epistemology from an 
ethical perspective is that many virtue epistemologists hold 
that we are, to varying degrees, responsible for our epistemic 
characters and conduct (e.g., Zagzebski 1996). In other 
words, epistemic agents can have both praiseworthy and/
or blameworthy psychologies. Blameworthy if, for exam-
ple, a manager dismisses the value of true beliefs in favor 
of acquiring only comforting beliefs. This exemplifies the 
vice of epistemic insouciance (Cassam 2018). Praiseworthy 
if, for example, a successful executive acknowledges their 
own fallibility and attends to their cognitive limitations in a 
humble and respectable manner. This exemplifies the virtue 
of epistemic humility (Roberts and Wood 2007).
Accordingly, management scholarship has begun to rec-
ognize the potential of virtue epistemology to offer both a 
rich new paradigm for applied ethics and a new lens for 
contemplating organizational learning and knowledge acqui-
sition. Following its introduction to management over the 
last 5 years (e.g., de Bruin 2013), virtue epistemology has 
begun to be applied to a range of business topics, including 
the global financial crisis (de Bruin 2014, 2015), managers’ 
ethical decision-making (Rawwas et al. 2013), the ethics 
and practices of ‘not knowing’ (Crossman and Doshi 2015), 
as well as organizational culture (Wei Choo 2016). In sum, 
“Ideas of epistemic virtue and vice are,” as Freeman (2015) 
notes, “an important addition to our way of thinking about 
business and ethics” (p. xi).
While we recognize these valuable contributions, we 
assert that one aspect in need of further development is a 
more thorough engagement with the conceptualization of 
epistemic vice. If epistemic virtues make us effective and 
responsible inquirers, epistemic vices make us deficient 
ones (Cassam 2016). They get in the way of what Hookway 
(2003) calls “effective and responsible inquiry” (p. 198). 
This is not to say that the epistemic vices are entirely absent 
from management literature (de Bruin 2015; Wei Choo 
2016). They do, however, tend to remain under-theorized. 
Just as management literature more broadly can tend to side-
line or overlook critical aspects of the ‘dark side of organiza-
tion’ (Linstead et al. 2014), virtue epistemology has tended 
to overlook the epistemic vices.
We therefore seek to contribute to virtue epistemology in 
business ethics by paying equal attention to important vices 
as well as just focusing on epistemic virtues. To this end, 
the current paper covers five key areas. First, we justify why 
ideas of epistemic virtue and vice matter at a fundamental 
level. Second, we introduce and develop theory from vice 
epistemology, a nascent but growing subfield of virtue epis-
temology which, to the best of our knowledge, has yet to 
be explicitly developed in terms of business ethics. Third, 
we make three arguments for why there is both space and 
need for a vice epistemology, particularly one sensitive to 
the context of business. Fourth, we review and outline a set 
of four major epistemic vices—malevolence, insouciance, 
hubris, and injustice—which we argue currently perme-
ate many organizations. Finally, we conclude by outlining 
a business ethics research agenda on epistemic vices, with 
implications for organizations and managers responding to 
epistemic vices and their illegitimacy in practice.
Epistemic Virtues and Vices
To justify closer examination of vice epistemology and the 
epistemic vices in organizations, it is worth considering why 
the notions of epistemic virtue and vice matter at a funda-
mental level. To some extent, epistemic virtues and vices are 
merely a subset of, or counterpart to, better-theorized, moral 
(non-epistemic) virtues and vices. Both virtue ethics and 
virtue epistemology, for example, focus their evaluations on 
an agent; agents are considered at least partially responsible 
for their traits and resulting actions; virtues are excellences 
Epistemic Vices in Organizations: Knowledge, Truth, and Unethical Conduct 
1 3
and vices are defects. However, there are also some key dis-
tinctions (Brady and Pritchard 2003).
To begin with, virtue and vice epistemology are primar-
ily interested in the relations between virtue/vices and the 
cultivation of epistemic goods. Epistemic goods include such 
things as ‘truth,’ ‘understanding,’ ‘wisdom,’ and ‘justifica-
tion,’ among others (Roberts and Wood 2003, p. 257). Epis-
temic virtues are specifically aimed at obtaining epistemic 
goods and not simply at doing the right thing. Although 
these aims might converge, they need not always do so and 
could perhaps even conflict (Annas 2003). In this way, the 
epistemic virtues and vices cannot simply be subsumed 
under the moral ones; they revolve around specific issues of 
truth, reasoning, self-reflection, knowledge, and knowing.
Epistemic virtues and vices also typically apply to differ-
ent actions than non-epistemic virtues and vices. De Bruin 
(2013) gives the example of epistemic courage as compared 
with non-epistemic courage. Imagine, for instance, the 
reporter who enters a dangerous war-zone in order to under-
take research. This ‘courage’ is the same courage required 
of the soldier too, albeit put to use for epistemic purposes. 
It does not thus qualify as epistemic courage. ‘Facing the 
truth,’ however, is a distinctly epistemic virtue, especially if 
it means adopting a belief that might harm oneself or one’s 
organization. If a manager has long held the belief that their 
product or service is health-promoting yet evidence begins 
to suggest otherwise, it takes a certain kind of courage—
‘epistemic courage’—to confront that knowledge and revise 
their prior beliefs.
Finally, while it is the case that some moral and epistemic 
virtues and vices have fairly close correspondences—for 
example, morally or epistemically, we can speak of someone 
as being cowardly or courageous; malevolent or benevolent; 
generous or miserly—others have no obvious moral equiva-
lent at all. Distinctively epistemic–ethical orientations might 
include inquisitiveness, gullibility, or high levels of cynicism.
In sum, epistemic virtues and vices are importantly and 
discernibly different from non-epistemic virtues and vices 
because they aim at different ends; apply to different kinds 
of actions; and can have no clear non-epistemic counterpart. 
Having established these broader differences between virtue 
ethics and virtue epistemology, we now consider vice epis-
temology and the epistemic vices in more detail.
Vice Epistemology and Conceptualizing Vices 
of the Mind
We have defined virtue epistemology above as the study of 
the cognitive character traits and attitudes that make us effec-
tive at, and responsible for, acquiring or transmitting epis-
temic goods (Battaly 2014). By contrast, vice epistemology 
is interested in those cognitive character traits and attitudes 
which obstruct the effective and responsible acquisition or 
transmission of epistemic goods—epistemic vices, or what 
Zagzebski (1996) calls ‘vices of the mind’ (Cassam 2016).
Broadly, Kidd (2017) notes that vice epistemology is 
devoted to three sorts of issues: first, to foundational issues 
concerning the nature and structure of epistemic vices; 
second, to studies of specific epistemic vices, such as epis-
temic malevolence (Baehr 2011), and other vices we exam-
ine below; and third, to applied vice epistemology, which 
explores how epistemic vices manifest in specific contexts, 
practices, systems, and communities. In the current paper, 
we continue to build on and extend these conceptual and 
applied aspects of vice epistemology by highlighting their 
importance to the cognition and conduct of organizational 
actors. For a thorough discussion of virtue epistemology and 
organization, see de Bruin (2013).
Before we examine and extend a range of epistemic vices 
to organizations, it is important to clarify what we mean by 
epistemic vice. The historical and contemporary literature 
on epistemic vice emphasizes two key ways in which an 
agent’s cognitive qualities may be characterized as epis-
temically vicious. They either (1) produce bad epistemic 
ends—falsehoods, incomprehension, or ignorance, for exam-
ple. Here, epistemic vices get their vicious quality solely 
from the negative epistemic ends they produce. Or (2) they 
involve bad epistemic motives—cowardice, close-minded-
ness, or insouciance, for example. Here, bad epistemic ends 
are not sufficient for epistemic vice. Epistemic vices get their 
vicious quality by also involving bad epistemic motives for 
which an agent can be considered blameworthy for possess-
ing (Battaly 2014). Each conceptualization corresponds to 
one of two main schools of thought in contemporary vice 
epistemology—those are vice-reliabilism in the case of (1) 
and vice-responsibilism in the case of (2) (Code 1987).
When epistemic ends or effects are all that matters, this 
conceptualization of epistemic vice is known as vice-relia-
bilism. For vice-reliabilists (e.g., Greco 1999; Sosa 1980), 
vices get their negative value by the bad epistemic ends they 
consistently produce, nothing more. Vice-reliabilists contend 
that epistemic vices are reliable dispositions that produce 
more false beliefs than true ones. These dispositions can 
be cognitive character traits, cognitive skills, or even hard-
wired faculties––for reliabilists, they all count as epistemic 
vices so long as they generate bad epistemic ends. In other 
words, reliabilist epistemic vices do not need to be acquired 
traits or motives; we can be born with them. Epistemic vices 
in this view might thus include more or less hard-wired (dis)
abilities such as poor vision, hearing problems, or Alzhei-
mer’s disease, all of which reliably produce bad epistemic 
ends.1 Unsurprisingly, vice-reliabilism does not account for 
1 Reliabilist epistemic virtues, on the other hand, might include cog-
nitive faculties such as ‘20/20 vision,’ ‘acute hearing,’ or ‘eidetic 
memory,’ all of which reliably produce good epistemic ends. Virtue-
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the ethical implications of epistemic issues, since agents 
have no control over the particular faculties Mother Nature 
provides them with. While vice-reliabilism offers a valu-
able contribution to contemporary issues in epistemology, 
we do not find it useful for the purposes of the current paper, 
which seeks to explore epistemic–ethical interfaces among 
organizational agents. Thus, when we refer to vice episte-
mology and the epistemic vices, we are not doing so in the 
reliabilist tradition.
By contrast, vice-responsibilism argues that producing 
bad epistemic effects is insufficient for vice (Battaly 2014). 
Epistemic vice also demands a blameworthy psychology. 
For vice-responsibilists (e.g., Zagzebski 1996; Fricker 
2007), vices get their negative value not simply by producing 
bad epistemic ends, but by also involving bad motivations 
and other blameworthy features of an agent’s psychology. If 
an agent produces bad epistemic effects through no fault of 
their own (for example, their memory deteriorates with age), 
this is not sufficient for epistemic vice in the responsibil-
ist tradition. If, however, an agent possesses bad epistemic 
motives, such as caring only about obtaining comforting 
beliefs (and not true ones), or caring only about themselves 
(and not others), then that agent may rightfully be attrib-
uted epistemic vice, provided they have some control over 
developing their cognitive traits (Battaly 2014). Epistemic 
vices in this view might thus include cognitive character 
traits such as a company director’s dogmatism or a male 
manager’s prejudice toward female employees as potential 
knowers. Both of these agents merit blame for the resulting 
failures and injustices of their epistemic character, so long as 
they have had some control over its development.2
As vice epistemologists correctly emphasize, vice-
responsibilists must exercise prudence when charging agents 
with epistemic vice (Kidd 2016). Virtue and vice theorists 
have long argued that our characters—moral and epis-
temic—are formed through processes of acculturation, repet-
itive practice, and habituation (e.g., Arjoon 2000; MacIntyre 
1981). In this way, agents develop attitudes, dispositions, 
and sensibilities over time through processes of socializa-
tion. Responsibility for epistemic virtues and vices is there-
fore likely to vary according to the epistemic environments 
and circumstances agents find themselves in (Medina 2013). 
We can, as Pritchard (2004) argues, be epistemically lucky 
or unlucky. Someone born into a family, community, or cul-
ture, or hired and socialized into an organization promot-
ing prejudicial ideas about superior views, or ‘facts’ and 
‘evidence’ being inferior to opinion or gut instinct might, 
for instance, be considered epistemically unlucky (Battaly 
2017a). In this case, such agents may carry a relatively low 
level of responsibility for possessing and exhibiting what 
appears to be epistemic vice. Anyone apportioning epistemic 
vice along responsibilist lines must therefore pay close atten-
tion to the epistemic obstacles agents may have faced, situ-
ationally and socially (Kamtekar 2004).
Another issue concerning the nature and structure of 
responsibilist epistemic vices is whether or not they should 
be treated as character traits in the stable, dispositional sense 
of the term. Some vice epistemologists follow Aristotle in 
arguing that vices are deep and lasting qualities of an agent 
that cause them to think and act in (relatively) stable ways 
(e.g., Zagzebski 1996). Recently, however, some vice epis-
temologists have argued that attitudes and ways of thinking 
could make up less restrictive conceptualizations of epis-
temic vice (Cassam 2016; Tanesini 2016). Agents might, 
for instance, engage in wishful thinking or ignore contrary 
evidence on some political and economic issues, but not oth-
ers. These more inclusive views on epistemic vice may go 
some way toward appeasing critical voices within virtue/vice 
theory who have raised concerns over the idea of agents pos-
sessing something like robust, dispositional character traits 
at all. Drawing from work in social psychology, Harman 
(2000) and Doris (2002) have argued that human behavior, 
epistemic or otherwise, is determined not by dispositional 
traits but by situational factors, such as whether or not a per-
son is in a hurry. Their situationist critique of virtue theory 
has generated much debate within business (virtue) ethics 
(e.g., Alzola 2008; Solomon 2003). Whether epistemic vices 
do or do not have to be character traits might, in our view, 
be considered as a matter of degree or disposition–situation 
interactivity, to be theorized and tested further in particular 
organizational and ethical–epistemological contexts (Johns 
2017).
One final issue currently being considered within virtue 
and vice epistemology is whether or not epistemic virtues 
and vices can and should be ascribed to collectives in addi-
tion to individuals (e.g., de Bruin 2015; Fricker 2009; Lah-
roodi 2007). Higher-order actors in the aggregate—boards, 
institutions, large firms, and other collectives—could 
all be held to share certain epistemic habits or outlooks 
toward information, knowledge, and truth that concerns 
them (Kilduff et al. 2011). Lahroodi (2007), for instance, 
argues that both individual and group epistemology can 
co-vary, such as a church committee that is narrow-minded 
toward gay rights as a group, while all or most members are 
2 Responsibilist epistemic virtues, on the other hand, might include 
an executive’s ‘open-mindedness’ to considering alternative ideas 
when it is appropriate to do so, or a ‘love of knowledge’ that encour-
ages evidence-based practices within an organization. These agents 
merit praise for their epistemic characters, provided they have some 
control over its development. Virtue-responsibilists contend that epis-
temic virtues are cognitive character traits that produce good epis-
temic ends and that an agent is praiseworthy for possessing.
Footnote 1 (continued)
reliabilists contend that epistemic virtues are reliable dispositions that 
produce more true beliefs than false ones.
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open-minded about gay rights. Similarly, group-level social 
cognitive biases and conformity pressures, such as group-
think and the Abilene paradox, show how groups can tend 
toward expressions of knowledge, decision, and behavior 
that are independent and divergent from the underlying or 
prior cognitions of individual members (e.g., Kim 2001).
Fricker (2009) also argues for attributing epistemic vir-
tues and vices to collectives, where individuals, despite per-
sonal beliefs and traits, make a joint commitment as ‘plural 
subjects’ to the beliefs and responsibilities of a group—a 
political party, for example. In discussing epistemic virtues 
within the financial services industry, de Bruin (2015) con-
tends that corporate epistemic virtues and vices matter. He 
sees such things as organizational functions, decision-mak-
ing structures, corporate culture, and sanctioning systems as 
loci of corporate epistemic virtue and vice. As per multilevel 
management theory more broadly, some virtues and vices 
may emerge or aggregate from individual group member dis-
tributions, while others may be irreducibly collective (e.g., 
Morgeson and Hofmann 1999).
In sum, a reliabilist view of epistemic vice points to cog-
nitive qualities that an agent arguably cannot and should 
not be blamed for possessing. A responsibilist view, by 
contrast, points to acquired motives and cognitive character 
traits for which an agent has some responsibility for, and for 
which they may merit some blame. Here we opt to confine 
epistemic vices to a responsibilist view for the purpose of 
appreciating how organizations can hold actors accountable 
for their expression, and make efforts to ameliorate vices 
that obstruct the acquisition or transmission of epistemic 
goods. We have also stressed the importance of exercising 
prudence when charging agents with epistemic vice, and that 
while some vice epistemologists think that epistemic vices 
need to be cognitive character traits, others hold that atti-
tudes and ways of thinking should be included too. Finally, 
in addition to ascribing epistemic vices to individuals, we 
have shown how groups and institutions can and arguably 
should be ascribed epistemically virtuous or vicious status. 
We now turn to look more closely at why epistemic vices 
deserve greater attention by virtue epistemologists and busi-
ness ethicists more generally.
The Importance of Epistemic Vices in Addition 
to Virtues
There are important reasons for theorizing and studying vice 
epistemology as distinct from virtues. In work on virtue (and 
vice) epistemology, until very recently, considerably more 
treatment has been given to the epistemic virtues than vices 
(Cassam 2016), meaning we know far more about epistemic 
virtues than we do the vices. We suggest three reasons why it 
is at least as important, if not more so, to focus on epistemic 
vice over virtue: (1) few actors are model epistemic agents; 
(2) theories of epistemic virtue leave us with an incomplete 
view of epistemic agents; and (3) amelioration of epistemic 
conduct partly depends on uncovering and understanding 
vices.
Few Actors are Model Epistemic Agents
Epistemic vices matter because many actors do not corre-
spond to the idealized rationality of ‘homo philosophicus’ 
(Cassam 2014) or ‘homo economicus’ (Thaler 2000). For 
most actors at work in organizations, there is a wide range 
of pernicious epistemic vices reflected in their conduct. 
Notions of actors’ bounded rationality, as cognitive misers 
conserving limited intellectual resources, and difficulties 
rooting out incompetence and vested interests all reflect 
challenging terrain for organizations in relation to valuing 
truth and principled inquiry over ignorance and fluency 
(Alvesson and Spicer 2012).
Acknowledging epistemic vice is therefore a necessary 
corrective to dominant approaches that emphasize managers’ 
and leaders’ virtues (Vince and Mazen 2014). A commit-
ment to vice is thus also a commitment to the primacy of 
the non-ideal. Rather than appeal to an ‘idealized knower,’ a 
vice epistemology remains attentive to the context and con-
duct of individuals and groups operating in suboptimal epis-
temic conditions (Brady and Pritchard 2003). To properly 
understand normative epistemic activities and offer guid-
ance for epistemic interactions inside organizations, it seems 
important to avoid idealizations of knowing and to recognize 
the messy realities of practice (Schön 1983). This includes 
the prioritization of real epistemic obstacles and vices over 
ideal enablers and virtues. Medina (2013, p. 38) argues that 
“we should start our theorizing by reflecting on the details of 
the actual injustices [epistemic vices] that surround us, rather 
than by speculating about what perfect justice [epistemic 
virtue] might be.” Indeed, assuming epistemic virtues are 
normal and widespread seems unlikely, over-optimistic and 
one-sided, given the complexity of organizations’ knowledge 
management demands and the general operations of power, 
politics, and conflict.
Epistemic Virtue Gives an Incomplete View of Epistemic 
Agents
We also propose that epistemic virtues are insufficient for 
explaining the full epistemological predicament of indi-
viduals and organizations. Vices matter because “virtues 
would be unreal if they did not have an opposite alterna-
tive. The vices are the defects of our qualities. Our nature 
provides for both” (Midgley 2001, p. 3). Uncovering why 
some agents care little about epistemic goods is surely as 
important a question as why some agents do care (Krae-
mer 2015). In terms of the prevalence and influence of 
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epistemic vices, we have little clear understanding of what 
epistemic vices exist, why they are so prevalent, or what 
functions, needs, and motives they serve—particularly 
inside organizations. Although certain cognitive biases are 
held to be a part of our psychological nature (e.g., Samuel-
son and Church 2015), we know little of how these biases 
interact with acquired epistemic traits and motivations, or 
how epistemic vices might compound our cognitive biases. 
To confront the errors individuals and organizations are 
prone to as inquirers, it would seem necessary and worth-
while to better understand the variety and range of epis-
temic conduct that might occur. A commitment to vice 
is thus a commitment to a more complete understanding 
of the epistemological context and conduct of epistemic 
agents.
Amelioration of Conduct Depends on Uncovering 
and Understanding Epistemic Vices
Finally, a one-sided focus on epistemic virtue over vice 
is partly explained by the presumption that vice is simply 
the absence of virtue (Midgley 2001). This assumption is 
strongly challenged, however, by the idea that epistemic 
vice can be positively cultivated and actively strengthened 
by various mechanisms (Tanesini 2016). This failure to 
actively recognize and theorize epistemic vices may con-
tribute to the invisibility of everyday epistemic vice inside 
organizations and the formation of reinforcing patterns of 
ignorance that perpetuate it and desensitize us to its harm-
ful effects (Medina 2013). As we argue further below, vari-
ous forms and degrees of epistemic vice are often unfold-
ing inside organizations, where agents show little to no 
regard for evidence, try to oppose epistemic goods that 
do not serve their vested interests, devalue minorities as 
potential knowers, and exaggerate their epistemic capabili-
ties, often with devastating consequences. To ameliorate 
perceived deficiencies in epistemic agents in such cases, 
it makes sense to identify and study epistemic vices and 
mechanisms that compound, constrain, or remedy them 
in organizations (de Bruin 2015). A commitment to vice 
is thus a commitment to understanding and ameliorating 
the conduct of contemporary epistemic agents, as well as 
fostering more corporate epistemic virtue in the form of 
knowledge sharing, democracy, and learning.
Taken together, these three inter-related justifications 
go a long way, we believe, toward verifying that there is 
both space and need for a vice epistemology, particularly 
one sensitive to the context of business and organization. 
Or, as Kidd (2015, p. 1) argues: “Vice epistemology is not 
an abstract exercise for the armchair, but a real contribu-
tion to the understanding and amelioration of our social 
world.”
Epistemic Vices in Organizations: Four Illustrative 
Examples
Thus far we have discussed the purview of vice epistemol-
ogy, the nature of epistemic vices, and the seriousness of 
studying them in relation to societies and organizations. 
Below we select and focus on four types of epistemic vice—
malevolence, insouciance, hubris, and injustice. These are 
intended as illustrative examples rather than being exhaus-
tive of all possible epistemic vices, but we argue that they 
are likely to be prevalent in many organizations, and that 
they reflect significant opposing forces to many major epis-
temic virtues (de Bruin 2013). They should be considered 
inter-related rather than mutually exclusive, as overlapping, 
co-occurring, and reflecting varying degrees of vicious 
agency and intent, individual and/or collective. We follow 
de Bruin (2015) and others (e.g., Lahroodi 2007; Fricker 
2009) in asserting that epistemically virtuous/vicious behav-
ior can be ascribed to collectives in addition to individu-
als. As our examples reveal, different organizational aims, 
structures, and cultures can intentionally or unintentionally 
obstruct the effective and responsible acquisition or trans-
mission of epistemic goods, even if no single actor within 
the organization may be said to be epistemically vicious. 
Finally, our examples are presented as offering a window 
onto the wider possibilities of borrowing and blending con-
cepts from the vice epistemology field, and using them to 
build valuable organization theory (Oswick et al. 2011). For 
treatment of epistemic vices outside of the four discussed 
below, additional examples might include epistemic insen-
sibility (Battaly 2013), self-indulgence (Battaly 2010), con-
formity (Battaly 2014), close-mindedness (Battaly 2017b), 
and dogmatism (Rokeach 1960).
Epistemic Malevolence
Epistemic malevolence is willful, active, and deep opposi-
tion to the epistemic good. Baehr (2011) argues that epis-
temic malevolence may be either personal or impersonal. 
Personal where the epistemically malevolent agent (roughly) 
opposes another person’s or group’s share in knowledge 
or their epistemic well-being. A dictator who takes active 
measures to thwart their citizens’ access to knowledge/epis-
temic goods is one typical example. In contrast, impersonal 
malevolence is where the epistemically malevolent agent 
(roughly) opposes epistemic goods in general. This could 
be a demonic and destructive agent who systematically 
deceives, appearing to delight in misleading all who desire 
to acquire epistemic goods, being strongly opposed to a clear 
idea of something like truth and knowledge public good. 
Baehr (2011) therefore contends that epistemic malevolence 
amounts to one of the strongest, purest, most wicked forms 
of epistemic vice. If epistemic virtue is fundamentally a 
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matter of being in favor of the acquisition and transmis-
sion of epistemic goods, staunch general opposition to these 
goods would epitomize epistemic vice and malevolence.
Perhaps unfortunately from a virtue epistemology per-
spective, management and organization is arguably replete 
with examples of epistemically malevolent agents—those 
who actively work to corrupt epistemic cultures and prevent 
the acquisition of epistemic goods. These malevolent agents 
are conceptualized by Kidd (2016) as ‘agnotogenic agen-
cies’—individuals, groups, and organizations dedicated to 
the spread of ignorance and confusion (Gross and McGoey 
2015; Roberts and Armitage 2008). Pacepa and Rychlak 
(2013) provide a detailed account of epistemically malevo-
lent organization when they reveal the history and tactics of 
Russian-led ‘dezinformatsiya’ campaigns. These campaigns 
sought to systematically and intentionally deceive public 
opinion using false information. Their success, as judged by 
their architects, rested on whether the mainstream media was 
sufficiently duped into publicizing deliberate falsehoods, and 
whether the consumers of such media believed the accounts 
accurate. Operation INFEKTION, for example, was revealed 
to be a Soviet deception campaign that sought to influence 
public opinion that the U.S. invented HIV/AIDS. Even the 
word ‘dezinformatsiya’ was given a French-sounding title 
to deceive others into believing it had originated in the west 
(Pacepa and Rychlak 2013).
Allegations continue to be made that many agencies, 
government and otherwise, systematically spread misin-
formation in attempts to profit from it. Facebook and other 
social media platforms have been harshly criticized for 
their creation of monetary incentives to spread falsehoods. 
Generators of fake content can solicit payment for their ser-
vices and then subsequently pay Facebook to promote fake 
stories (Ohlheiser 2016). In early signs that such platforms 
are considered by other firms as illegitimate and epistemi-
cally malevolent, Unilever has recently threatened to pull its 
advertising from those platforms contributing to the spread 
of fake news and its ilk (Russon 2018). The managerial con-
sequences of firms engaging in or facilitating such epistemi-
cally malevolent behavior will be a fruitful area for future 
research. Here, as with our earlier example of ‘dezinformat-
siya’ campaigns, we find a case where an entire organization 
may be said to be behaving in epistemically vicious ways. 
For Operation INFEKTION, it is their organizational aim 
that is epistemically malevolent. For Facebook, it is their 
platform’s incentivization of such behavior that is so.
If organizations do not find internal agents willing to 
actively oppose the epistemic well-being of stakeholders, 
there are evidently plenty of other malevolent brokers of 
deception and misinformation for sale. Oreskes and Conway 
(2012), for example, show how dozens of high-level scien-
tists and spin doctors ran effective campaigns to intentionally 
mislead and cloud the public’s understanding of the dangers 
of tobacco smoke, acid rain, asbestos, and global warming. 
“Doubt is our product,” declared one such tobacco company 
executive (Oreskes and Conway 2012, p. 34). Recognizing 
that the industry could not simply deny the overwhelming 
scientific consensus on the hazards of tobacco smoke, it 
paid ‘merchants of doubt’ to use otherwise normal scien-
tific uncertainty to undermine the status of genuine scien-
tific knowledge and manufacture the impression that findings 
were inconclusive. Thousands of internal tobacco company 
documents released through whistleblowers and litigation 
revealed, however, the industry executives’ acute awareness 
of their systematic deceit (Oreskes and Conway 2012). In 
regulation-heavy industries in general, large organizations 
may feel strategically empowered to deliberately manipulate 
unfavorable information by stalling for time, lobbying, and 
manipulating the terms of debate (Marcus 1987). In public 
relations, ‘astroturf’ campaigns are designed to elaborately 
fake the appearance of grassroots support for organizations 
that want to appear on the right side of an epistemic issue 
(Glaser 2012).
Such epistemic wickedness and malevolence may be dif-
ficult for moral philosophy to fully isolate and understand in 
terms of motives and responsibility (Midgley 2001). Any-
where, however, in the politics of a knowledge economy 
where organizations and individuals are implicated in poten-
tial lobbying, propaganda, secrecy, misinformation, espio-
nage, and other deceitful campaigns, we might expect to find 
this vice in practice.
Epistemic Insouciance
To be insouciant is to be indifferent. To be epistemically 
insouciant is to be indifferent or show a casual lack of con-
cern toward epistemic goods (Cassam 2018). Following 
Roberts and Wood (2003), we have stated that epistemic 
goods include such properties as ‘truthfulness,’ ‘justifica-
tion,’ ‘coherence,’ ‘knowledge,’ and ‘reasoning.’ Showing a 
lack of concern toward these goods undermines their wider 
acquisition and transmission. Epistemic insouciance is thus 
an epistemic vice in that it gets in the way of the effective 
and responsible acquisition and transmission of epistemic 
goods.
As with our other example vices, there are numerous 
cases to draw upon where we might find this vice in prac-
tice. Many debates on social media platforms around politi-
cal events in the UK and US have, for instance, involved 
voters and politicians alike enacting a culture of epistemic 
insouciance by questioning the value of evidence and sta-
tistics being quoted at them, and instead preferring to stick 
to their own views (e.g., Hinsliff 2016). Such actors do not 
appear to be concerned with genuinely critiquing forms of 
evidence and analysis, but rather with dismissing epistemic 
goods and uncritically maintaining their beliefs. This kind of 
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epistemic insouciance begets wishful thinking and is fueled 
by confirmation biases. When people act based on this kind 
of epistemic conduct at the voting booth, the consequences 
of their doing so may lead to disturbing outcomes. This is 
especially true when the agent in question is epistemically 
insouciant toward far-reaching and materially consequential 
epistemic issues—for example, understanding the pros and 
cons of the UK’s relationship with the European Union. It 
is arguably less important if the matter to which one is epis-
temically insouciant is of lower significance—for example, 
cultivating knowledge about the color changes of a celeb-
rity’s hair (Battaly 2013).
In characterizations of a twenty-first century ‘post-truth’ 
information era, epistemic insouciance has—under various 
guises—received significant attention within scholarly and 
popular discourse (Davis 2017; D’Ancona 2017). Manage-
ment and organization have been strongly implicated in its 
systematic production (Alvesson and Spicer 2012; Spicer 
2017). Explicitly or implicitly, many organizations encour-
age or condone a lack of reflexivity, investigation, substan-
tive reasoning, and justification among members (e.g., 
Alvesson and Spicer 2012; Jackall 1988). Naomi Klein 
(2000), for example, describes the epistemically insouci-
ant advertising agency director who advises their market-
ing team never to visit the factories from which the prod-
ucts they promote came, knowing this truth would make 
the superficial adverts they write much more difficult and 
less effective. Ten Bos (2007) cites Whyte’s (1956) study 
of an epistemically insouciant American oil company cul-
ture which thwarted its workers’ pursuit of epistemic goods 
through the following unequivocal advertisement: ‘No Vir-
tuosos Here!’
Organizations are also implicated in the creation, circula-
tion, and consumption of substantial quantities of talk and 
text which have little respect for or relationship to evidence 
or justification. Building on the seminal work of Harry 
Frankfurt (2005), Spicer (2013) explicitly labels this kind 
of organizational discourse ‘bullshit,’ with modern man-
agement offering a “veritable treasure trove of examples” 
(p. 658). Barriers to learning and rationality can appear 
legion, and the willful blindness, individual and collective, 
to deeper consideration of important ethical issues can seem 
troubling and alarming (e.g., Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 
2011; Palazzo et al. 2012).
While many of these works provide accounts of why indi-
viduals and organizations might actively support epistemic 
insouciance, they are largely absent of engagement with the 
ethical and epistemological implications of doing so, tending 
to use more descriptive or value-neutral terms, describing 
outcomes of systems with a mixture of functionally dysfunc-
tional properties. This leaves open considerable space for 
business ethicists to inquire about the ethical implications 
of fostering managerial dispositions that disregard evidence 
or justification—that is, supporting the production of epis-
temic insouciance. Individuals, organizations, and interest 
groups that either have, or encourage others to have, scant 
regard for evidence and epistemic goods ought perhaps to 
be challenged as to how evidence-based their principles and 
decisions are, if they are unreasonably rejecting opportuni-
ties for reflection and dialogue (Erez and Grant 2014). Some, 
but not all, of the worst corporate, natural, and humanitar-
ian disasters might have been prevented had only evidence 
been valued, reflexivity encouraged, justification required, 
and knowledge sought, both individually and collectively 
(Nam and Lemak 2007).
Epistemic Hubris
Epistemic hubris is an inflated sense of epistemic privilege 
and pride (Ogden 2017). Bound closely to power, arrogance, 
and over-confidence, it manifests in one of two ways, but the 
epistemically hubristic may often exhibit both in relation to 
their knowledge, credibility, and expertise.
The first is the conviction that one has epistemic author-
ity or superiority where one in fact lacks it (Kraemer 2015). 
It thus involves a false inference about the state of one’s 
knowledge and expertise relative to others (Roberts and 
Wood 2007). Consider, for instance, the hubristic property 
tycoon who claims they need no prior training or knowl-
edge of political theory in order to master the governance 
of a country. They believe their status in business makes 
them best-placed to judge the relative merits and demerits 
of foreign and domestic policy, when this is surely false. In 
contrast, epistemic authority can be said to more legitimately 
rest on a person’s knowledge and understanding of the issues 
at stake, not on their positional status (de Bruin 2013). In the 
worst cases then, those agents who possess this first kind of 
epistemic hubris indulge in a kind of delusional cognitive 
omnipotence (Spengler 1972). They over-exaggerate their 
knowledge claims and frequently misjudge the realities of 
the situation (Claxton et al. 2013). Importantly, we would 
add that it is not simply an error of judgment which qualifies 
epistemic hubris as an epistemic vice. It is of course pos-
sible to misjudge a situation or to be incorrect without being 
hubristic. It is the agent’s conviction of their infallibility and 
epistemic superiority that is constitutive of this vice.
A second, subtler manifestation of epistemic hubris is 
the conviction that one has the right or privilege not to 
know, or not to need to know (Tanesini 2016). Machiner-
ies of oppression can serve to render violent events such as 
genocide invisible within hubristic cultures (Medina 2013), 
hidden from the privileged classes’ sight to protect and spare 
them from any unnecessary ‘trouble’ that might accompany 
‘knowing’ (Stokes and Gabriel 2010). More commonly, 
the privilege to ignore many ethically significant facts of 
social and organizational life is frequently exercised by those 
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wielding power within workplaces (Jackall 1988). When 
managers or executives ridicule the considerations of the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) department as being 
trivial or none of their concern, for example, this instantiates 
this second kind of epistemic hubris. This kind of epistemic 
hubris also manifests when agents attempt to inoculate them-
selves against dissenting voices (Stein 2003), or when they 
hold contempt toward the advice and/or criticism of others 
(Owen and Davidson 2009). Feelings of power can reduce 
empathy, compassion, and attentiveness to others (Van Kleef 
et al. 2008), and leader–follower dynamics and distances 
may reinforce a leader’s privileges to not know or care about 
matters deemed trivial or beneath them (e.g., Gabriel 1997). 
Thus, not only do the epistemically hubristic make deliber-
ately false inferences about the limits of their knowledge, 
they may also infer that some areas of (important) social 
inquiry or knowledge acquisition are not worth being known, 
or simply beneath their consideration.
As with the other vices, epistemic hubris undermines a 
growth in epistemic goods, given that “When whatever one 
says, goes—because one’s word is the law or the truth oth-
ers are bound to uphold and abide by—there is a complete 
lack of resistance from the world and from others that gets 
in the way of knowledge acquisition” (Medina 2013, p. 33). 
Epistemic hubris may unknowingly and relationally promote 
other epistemic vices in those party to it, in their servility 
and timidity. Depending on whether they are led by hubris-
tic or humble leaders, for instance, teams show decreased 
and increased acquisition of knowledge, respectively (Nev-
icka et al. 2011; Weiss and Knight 1980). If followers feel 
psychologically safe to speak up about errors and learning 
across organizations, then epistemic hubris might be reduced 
or less likely to emerge (Detert and Burris 2007).
Recently, hubris as a subject of management inquiry has 
achieved considerable attention, including several reviews 
(e.g., Picone et al. 2014; Sadler-Smith et al. 2017). Theo-
ries on hubris have been developed to explain a range of 
organizational phenomena, including venture failure (Hay-
ward 2007), reckless risk-taking (Haynes et al. 2015), leader 
under-performance (Malmendier and Tate 2009), and poor 
acquisition valuations (Roll 1986). It is generally considered 
to be dysfunctional, if not ethically vicious. Unlike here, 
however, these studies do not separate epistemic hubris from 
hubris more generally. We locate the difference in epistemic 
hubris in terms of how it uniquely relates to the arrogance 
and over-confidence surrounding knowing.
Epistemic Injustice
In addition to other economic, political, and social types 
of injustice in organizations, epistemic injustice describes 
someone being specifically wronged in terms of their cred-
ibility and capacity as a knower (Fricker 2003, 2007). 
Epistemic injustice has roots in social epistemology and 
feminist theory, given that often women and other social 
minorities can be mistreated in terms of judgments of their 
credibility. Given the relatively large stream of work on 
types of organizational justice (e.g., Rupp et al. 2017), it is 
surprising that epistemic (in)justice has not, to our knowl-
edge, been considered in much detail within management 
and organization theory (although see de Bruin 2015, for 
some initial application to financial services). In her pivotal 
book-length treatment of the subject, Epistemic Injustice: 
Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Miranda Fricker (2007) 
defines and distinguishes two main forms of epistemic injus-
tice: (1) testimonial, where a deflated level of credibility is 
attributed to someone’s communications because of their 
social status; and (2) hermeneutic, where someone lacks 
the social resources to articulate and make sense of their 
own experiences, and may not even believe themselves to 
know anything. The two need not be mutually exclusive, 
necessarily—a ‘double’ victim of this sort of injustice could 
both have their testimonials not believed by powerful others 
while also doubting their own minds in representing a reality 
credibly and capably to themselves and other victims.
As with the three vices above, critical examples of this 
conduct in organizations and business abound. Anywhere in 
organizations and societies where there are gendered, ethnic, 
disabled, or other minorities, there is a likelihood of many 
epistemic injustices of both forms occurring (Kidd et al. 
2017). An employee with a healthcare or disability issue 
may either not be believed by epistemically unjust managers 
or doctors (testimonial), or find it difficult to explain, formu-
late, and secure reasonable adjustments (hermeneutic) (Kidd 
and Carel 2017). Women may report having their workplace 
testimonials or contributions ignored or ‘mansplained’ back 
to them in an epistemically unjust culture, where men are 
unfairly discrediting, then re-appropriating, their role as a 
credible knower (Luzzi 2016). In Obama’s White House 
Oval Office, for example, women used a strategy of ‘ampli-
fication’ to collectively combat epistemic injustice and boost 
their credibility, by overtly recognizing and repeating one 
another’s verbal contributions to strategy and policy discus-
sions (Eilperin 2016).
Anywhere employees, subordinates, or middle manag-
ers are not believed or taken seriously as credible epistemic 
agents in organizations, they may have to work harder at 
‘issue selling’—using bottom-up influence tactics to achieve 
organizational change and make a credible case to decision-
makers and stakeholders with greater influence (Dutton 
et al. 2001). Epistemic injustice is still an emerging notion 
in epistemology, but it seems likely that in organizations, 
downplayed or discarded testimonies and hermeneutic strug-
gles to feel credible to oneself and others pose a serious 
issue for fostering open and inclusive cultures. Perceptions 
of epistemic fairness and unfairness may vary over time and 
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across different parties, and require coordinated institutional 
efforts to track their cumulative and systemic effects (Ander-
son 2012).
Left unchecked, there is the risk that groups continue 
to be silenced and marginalized, and epistemic injustice 
morphs and extends into epistemic oppression, a persis-
tent exclusion from knowledge production (Dotson 2014). 
Expressed more manipulatively and deceptively, epistemic 
injustice may come to resemble epistemic malevolence as 
described above. Gaslighting, for example, concerns epis-
temically unjust actors unjustly manipulating others’ reali-
ties to cause them to doubt themselves and feel as if they 
are losing their minds, to find all their testimony discredited 
and themselves lacking the resources to interpret the very 
grounds of their reality (Abramson 2014; McKinnon 2016).
Recently, Battaly (2017a) has raised some doubts over 
the status of epistemic injustice as a responsibilist epis-
temic vice. Recall from our earlier discussion that in order 
for epistemic injustice to qualify as a responsibilist epis-
temic vice, the agent in question must have some control 
over their possession of it. Battaly (2017a) uses a number 
of interesting, albeit extreme, examples to argue that those 
who remain inside highly insular organizations (for example, 
the Taliban or ISIS) may not qualify for epistemic injustice 
in the responsibilist tradition. They simply are not afforded 
the opportunity to know better, and lacking control over 
their epistemic circumstances cannot be blamed for their 
prejudices. However, in her recent work, Fricker (2016) 
has argued that we can still be blameworthy for epistemi-
cally vicious behavior that is “beyond our ken and control” 
(p. 41), where “uncharacteristic acts and motives can still 
be ours in the relevant sense—features of our epistemic 
system” (p. 41). This raises a number of interesting chal-
lenges for vice epistemologists, such as how to distinguish 
between “dispositions that have their source in the agent’s 
epistemic character or system from dispositions that “merely 
flow through” the agent but have their source in the environ-
ment” (Battaly 2017a, p. 230). As business ethicists have 
long argued, unethical behavior is rarely a simple case of 
‘bad apples’ doing bad things. We need to be willing to look 
for bad barrels (organizations) and even bad orchards (insti-
tutions) (Ashkanasy et al. 2006; Trevino and; Youngblood 
1990).
Managing Epistemic Vices in Organizations: 
An Agenda for Research and Practice
In this article, we have argued for the general importance 
of drawing on virtue epistemology to better understand the 
epistemic conduct of organizations and actors in organiza-
tional systems, in terms of contexts where claims to truth 
and knowledge are continually being expressed, renegoti-
ated, and acted upon by epistemic agents. We have argued 
that while epistemic virtues have received some recent atten-
tion in business ethics and virtue epistemology, epistemic 
vices have remained more neglected. Accordingly, we have 
made a case for the importance of vice epistemology in 
organizations, providing some illustrative examples of con-
ceptualizations of vices and where they can occur in various 
organizational contexts. We conclude this article with some 
more specific opportunities and contributions constituting 
an agenda for theoretical, research-driven, and practical 
engagement with epistemic vices (and often, by implica-
tion, virtues also) in organizations.
First, as with any social or normative construct, there 
is a level of analysis question around how best to attribute 
vicious epistemic conduct to individuals, groups, and institu-
tions at different levels of social aggregation. We have out-
lined some arguments about whether groups and institutions 
can and should be ascribed a status as genuine cognizers 
that are either vicious or virtuous (Fricker 2009; Lahroodi 
2007). However, work in this area is still very nascent, and 
how virtue and vice epistemology emerge across different 
levels of analysis merits further consideration, as we indicate 
below in terms of related issues of agency, responsibility, 
and culture.
There is also the issue of the desirability and feasibility 
of tackling epistemic vices; whether organizations can or 
should care about affecting the acquisition and transmis-
sion of epistemic goods, and on what basis. de Bruin (2013) 
develops an instrumental view of epistemic virtue as ena-
bling and motivating people inside organizations to perform 
epistemic actions. In terms of learning, knowledge, deeper 
forms of inquiry, and building accurate and innovative forms 
of consensus, by acquiring epistemic goods organizations 
better align their actions with reality and thus improve their 
prospects of achieving success and creating value more 
widely (Wei Choo 2016). In fact, much virtue epistemology 
primarily considers the promotion of virtue and reduction 
of vice as intrinsically valuable (Baehr 2011). Nevertheless, 
an instrumental approach helps to explain which epistemic 
goods a person should aim to achieve, why, and under what 
stakes, incentives, or conditions.
Bad epistemic outcomes such as ignorance, denial, and 
fabrication are likely to be cultivated to serve business ends, 
at least in some cases (Alvesson and Spicer 2012; Oreskes 
and Conway 2012). Epistemic vices might therefore be func-
tional and instrumental to the success of some organiza-
tions, but this does not excuse those who perpetuate them 
from the moral implications of doing so. As with diversity 
management or CSR, there will often be a ‘business case’ 
and a ‘moral case’ to pursuing various prosocial practices, 
cultures, and behaviors, the latter going beyond a narrow 
instrumental orientation. From an evolutionary perspective, 
as social organisms hoping to trust one another and cooper-
ate, it is generally important for us to communicate clearly 
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and honestly most of the time, and to stay alert and deter and 
punish those who distort information by vicious epistemic 
conduct (Sperber et al. 2010), albeit with the important qual-
ification that deceit and self-deception confer advantages too 
(Trivers 2011).
On this point, Kidd (2016) has discussed the idea that 
actors can challenge epistemic vices through the critical 
practice of ‘epistemic vice charging,’ which is essentially 
the act of ‘calling out’ others for their epistemic misconduct. 
Kidd (2016) does note, however, the considerable difficulties 
in practice of assuming responsibility for epistemic issues, 
as well as building consensus in convincing the target and 
others, which may require further epistemic divisions of 
labor. Echoing concerns regarding the difficulties of tack-
ling epistemic vice and promoting epistemic virtue, Borg 
and Hooker (2017) express skepticism that organizations 
or regulatory bodies can do much to ameliorate (unethical) 
conduct by directly focusing on them. Epistemic motivations 
and conflicts in organizations, moral and instrumental, thus 
merit future research along these lines, as do the limitations 
of epistemic virtue theory as applied to business contexts 
and cultures. In the case of banking, for instance, Herzog 
(2017) has argued that professional associations and regu-
lators need to work together to align banking communities 
around preventing epistemic harms to clients and societies, 
as well as promoting epistemic virtues and goods.
A deeper, critical problem concerns how epistemic vices 
can often be cloaked or disguised as their opposite, where 
the very presence or declaration of epistemic virtue is in fact 
more indicative of vice. Authenticity becomes fakery, sin-
cerity becomes dishonesty, humility becomes self-aggran-
dizement, skepticism becomes gullibility, and so on—until 
virtues and vices become blurred and oxymoronic. Glaser 
(2012) has made this argument quite forcefully in terms of 
highlighting the use of covert ideologies and soft power 
techniques to disrupt the relationships between appear-
ances and realities, where saying, meaning, and doing have 
become decoupled. Research on epistemic vices should 
therefore remain explicitly concerned with false virtues 
hiding in plain sight, considering inconsistencies between 
the sayings, meanings, and doings of organizational actors. 
This might include considering levels of epistemic vigi-
lance to soft or covert power techniques, ironic discrepan-
cies between intentions and outcomes, and the perceived 
hypocrisy of inconsistent talk, decisions, ideas, and actions.
For the sake of epistemological reflexivity, reflections on 
more extreme postmodern perspectives on epistemic vice 
also merit further development. Long have postmodern think-
ers such as Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean Baudrillard put 
forward radical epistemological views, whether it is skepti-
cism toward ‘grand narratives,’ or seeing the epistemologi-
cal state of play in organizations as metaphorically akin to 
a house of mirrors, Russian Doll, theatrical performance or 
computer simulation in terms of the fragmented and layered 
claims to truth and reality (e.g., Boje 1995; Gustafson 2000). 
It would be interesting therefore to consider the implications 
of these perspectives in terms of epistemic vices and virtues. 
For instance, whether or not it is possible to fight epistemic 
vice without being complicit in it, whether epistemic agency 
should concern itself with ‘small narratives’ only, or how to 
balance a playful and rebellious attitude with a responsible one 
toward epistemic conduct, and so on. Beyond postmodernism, 
the same holds for other critical management epistemologies, 
such as feminism and psychoanalysis (Adler et al. 2007).
A key contextual recognition for future research on epis-
temic vices lies in terms of the digital and media environment 
of organizational communications. Aspects of the Internet, big 
data, and social media may exacerbate certain forms of epis-
temic vice, leading to novel forms of epistemological chaos or 
crisis (e.g., Nunan and Di Domenico 2017). Dennett and Roy 
(2015), for example, have argued that the radical transparency 
of the Internet and related developments will create evolution-
ary pressures on organizational forms to evolve newly sophisti-
cated ways of detecting and obfuscating knowledge and cred-
ibility. ‘Filter bubbles’ and ‘echo chambers’ that only provide 
us with information and responses filtered to confirm our sub-
jective biases will be erected and circumnavigated through dif-
ferent forms of epistemic conduct in relation to organizations 
(Bozdag and van den Hoven 2015; Vaccari 2013).
Finally, virtue and vice epistemology can be directed 
toward diverse and changing epistemic communities, val-
ues, and (un)ethical practices. Aristotle’s epistemological 
concepts of techne, poiesis, phronesis, praxis, sophia, and 
episteme, for example, all denote inter-related scientific, 
practical, and moral ways of knowing (Chishtie 2012). 
Increasingly, more diverse ways of knowing rooted more 
directly in practice, craft, judgement, the body and collec-
tivities are being recognized in management (e.g., Gärtner 
2013; Rennstam and Ashcraft 2014). Furthermore, Cook and 
Brown (1999) propose that effective knowledge management 
and innovation in organizations rests on the ability to bridge 
epistemologies or ways of knowing, moving between indi-
vidual and group knowing, and tacit and explicit knowing, 
to arrive periodically at newly valuable forms of knowledge 
and knowing in the process. Similarly, we propose that 
epistemological vices and virtues are likely to be enacted 
through the interactions, intersections, and movements 
between different ways of knowing and the knowledge they 
produce.
Conclusion
Combining aspects of virtue ethics and epistemology, virtue 
epistemology pursues a program seeking to overcome the 
longstanding preoccupation of epistemology with skepticism 
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and with arcane efforts to define knowledge, and to reestab-
lish epistemology as a discipline with a broader social and 
organizational importance (Roberts and Wood 2007). By 
shifting emphasis from analytical properties of beliefs to 
the epistemic characteristics of agents, virtue epistemolo-
gists open up a new epistemological program suggesting that 
we can and should promote epistemic well-being, humanize 
and deepen epistemology, ameliorate epistemic characters 
and communities, and provide a more complete account of 
concepts such as ‘knowledge,’ ‘evidence,’ and ‘justifica-
tion’ beyond a purely non-normative vocabulary (Zagzebski 
1996). In this paper, we have focused on epistemic vices and 
vice epistemology in particular, as neglected but important 
in their interdependent relations with epistemic virtues. We 
hope that the epistemic vice agenda laid out here will give 
scholars and practitioners novel ways of reevaluating the 
business ethics of truth, knowledge, and knowing.
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